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Towards a New Paradigm for Social Science Research 
INTRODUCTION : 
When I first came across a statement to the effect that it normally 
takes the social sciences fifty years to digest and assimilate any new 
development in the physical sciences, I took that for some kind of 
exaggeration. With the modern explosion in communications, the 
statement seemed too pessimistic to be applicable to the world of 
today. Not until I came to consider the fate-in the social sciences- of 
the magnificent developments which have been taking place in the 
natural sciences since the early decades of this century. These great 
scientific discoveries, the impact of which is forcing a deep rethinking 
of science itself, thus leading to the emergence of the “New 
philosophy of science” have hardly made a dent on the social 
sciences. What is especially deplorable about this is that these 
particular developments in the natural sciences should have been of 
great interest because of their special relevance for the social sciences. 
They indeed seem to be ushering in a brave new understanding of the 
nature of matter, human being, and mind. But most social scientists 
s ‘hold a too deep-seated belief in the positivist/ empiricist tradition 
science to allow them to conception of what should constitute “true” 
the only” harbor any serious doubts about its validity. For them, it is “ 
perspective from which to see and to understand the world. For them, 
it looks so unscientific, or almost heretical to think otherwise. This 
recalcitrance, understandably incensed the critics of positivism, who 
became more defiant and more virulent in their criticism. Since’extreme positions - by 
definition - tend to distort the truth, the critics 
suggestions to remedy the situation turned out to be the less palatable - 
even to those who may basically accept the arguments against 
positivism. Which, in turn, seems to have resulted in an impasse. 
Some of those critics, who came to be known as the post-positivists 
or post-empiricists, seem to have to resort to extremes to be able to 
shake the faith-like convictions of the hard-core empiricists. 
Moreover, to be convincing, the critics were less interested in coming 
up with what could look like viable alternatives as much as to live up 
to their extreme criticism of positivism - at the cost of becoming even 
less convincing. Many scholars considered to be themselves among 
the post-positivists could hardly accept such extreme alternatives. The 
whole situation, then, seems to call for a more balanced approach to 
both aspects of the issue : the critique of the dominant paradigm on 
the one hand, and the proposed alternatives on the other. 
The position adopted throughout this paper is that the crucial, wellfounded objections 
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leveled against the positivist/ empiricist tradition 
should never blind us not to see what is still valid and valuable in that 
tradition, specifically when it comes to the study of the empirical 
aspects of reality. It would only be self-defeating to deny that even 
human and social phenomena have their empirical aspects that lend 
themselves readily to observation through sense experience. But sense 
experiences and observation from outside definitely do not tell the 
whole story of human behavior. The basic problem with positivism (in 
its purist forms), it seems, does not lie as much with its inherent 
invalidity as it is in its exclusivity, that is, its uncompromising 
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insistence that sense experience is “exclusively” the one and only 
legitimate source for all “scientific” knowledge (while grudgingly 
accepting a limited role for reason in its logical-positivist variety). 
What is regrettable in this connection, is that such assumption 
(amounting to a “belief” is not based on any particularly “scientific”, 
empirically validated, or even logical considerations, but it is - 
strangely enough - based on historical/political contingencies, as will 
be shown below. It is then only reasonable to suggest that any 
successful revision of the current epistemological scene should first 
tackle and then transcend the effects of these historical/ political 
factors. 
The crisis - as some insist when characterizing the situation - in 
social science scholarship in general, and at the methodological front 
in particular, is reflected in the following tripartite problematic 
situation: 
(1) The Critique : Where we have those waging dire attacks on the 
positivist/ empiricist tradition, attacks that at times deny any 
claims to truth for that perspective, which renders those claims 
ineffective. 
(2) The Alternatives: Where we encounter unconvincing extreme 
alternatives to positivism, suggested by the same critics, which 
result in more renitency on the part of the positivists. 
(3) The Context: Where we note inability of both parties to 
appreciate, and then to effectively transcend the historical/political 
roots of the debate. 
كفتıدلجم ، ر ) ، (1ددع )1420/99 ، (1أ ـه. ميهاربإ دبجر 
It could be added at once that Immoderation and immodesty 
complicate the whole situation, for these are indeed the nemeses of 
effective exchange among otherwise very thoughtful scholars. 
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate, in a systematic fashion, on 
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the issues alluded to above, with the intention to hopefully providing 
some perspective on their problematics - as far as is possible at this 
point in time. To do justice to all three aspects of the debate, it might 
be appropriate to start our discussion with a clear statement of the 
positivist/ empiricist position before embarking on an analysis of its 
historical and intellectual roots. This should set the stage for a 
rigorous critique of empiricism, especially in its rugged forms. On the 
basis of that analysis a new synthesis is suggested here, which it is 
hoped, would be adequate to addressing the valid criticisms made 
against empiricism, while attempting to rectify the blatant omissions 
of the old paradigm. But it should be asserted from the start that this 
task could never be achieved except after exorcising ourselves first of 
those historical demons that we alluded to earlier ... which may mean 
as Pitrim Sorokin (1941) would suggest, nothing less than a major 
transformation in our current value configuration. The suggested 
alternative may sound a bit radical for those who are still caught into 
phraseology (1982). ’the “orthodox consensus”, to use Giddens 
However, this seems to be exactly what is needed for us to be able to 
free ourselves from the bondage of the familiar, and to help us 
respond to the situation in fresh, vigorous and unhesitant ways. 
مولعلا ةفسلفو ةفسلفلاTowards a New Paradigm for Social Science Research 
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE POSITIVIST/ (II) 
EMPIRICIST LEGACY 
Although it may be very hard to believe by many, contemporary 
reevaluations of the history of science have shown that the “idea of 
science ... (as we know it today) is only one of many, and that it is a 
product of temporary circumstances” (emphasis added) (Ravetz, 1975 
: 366). Historians of science, according to Ravetz, are also coming to 
view present conceptions of science as “one phase in a continuing 
evolution”, and that modern science as we know it is an integral part 
of European civilization (and Western way of life), reflecting “its 
faults as well as its virtues” (p. 375). In the same vein, Johan Galtung 
(1977) writes that any discussion of scientific methodology “without 
reference to the underlying social structure is misleading. That kind of 
discussion will only lead to pretenses of universalism and 
absolutism..” (p.13). Tudor (1982) completes the demystification 
process by stating that “science is a social activity like any other and 
constraints and virtues”. ’ irrational‘thus subject to similar 
(p.31). So, far from being the safe, unbiased, and immutable process 
we think it is, the scientific method has been shaped through its 
development by such mundane things as culture, ideology, politics, 
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self interest, and even long-standing hatreds and animosities. These 
and similar eye-opening insights should prove to us how fallible we 
all are, and that we cannot grant, even to science, the kind of blind 
respect and trust that only religion did one day muster, and which 
science, incidentally, has valiantly fought to dispossess religion of! 
Bergin (1980) sums up the situation beautifully when he states that: 
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“Science has lost its authority as the dominating source of truth it once 
was. This change is both reflected in and stimulated by analyses that 
reveal science to be an intuitive and value-Iaden cultural form.. 
Although a belief in the value of the scientific method appropriately 
persists, there is a widespread disillusionment with the way it has been 
used and a loss of faith in it as the cure for human ills” (p.95). 
Thus we do indeed have, not only a moral, but in fact a “scientific” 
obligation and responsibility to closely examine our conceptions of 
the scientific method to see where did we err, particularly in our 
efforts at the “scientific” study of human beings. This takes us directly 
to the positivist/ empiricist legacy. The Modern Dictionary of 
Sociology defines positivism as “the philosophical position holding 
that knowledge can be derived only from sensory experience” 
(Theodorson and Theodorson 1969:306). A variant of positivism, 
“logical positivism”, only concedes that “logical analysis is needed 
to clarify meanings that have been verified or falsified through sense 
experience, but such analyses should be closely associated with 
empirical observation ...” (p.307). Logical positivists at the same time 
condemn “..as nonsense ...all moral, aesthetic, and metaphysical 
assertions”. (Feigl, 1975: 879). “Logical empiricism”, a modified 
version of the above, developed in the mid thirties of this century, 
relinquished the designation “positivism” altogether because of the 
negative attitude it carries toward the existence of any “theoretical” 
entities. “Empiricism” is, however, retained as it insists on “the 
requirement that hypotheses and theories be empirically testable” 
(p.881). Logical empiricism, which is the dominant philosophy 
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guiding scientific inquiry today, also insists that “all statements 
about moral ... or religious values are scientifically unverifiable and 
meaningless” (Levi, 1975:273). 
But how can we explain the messianic zeal with which the 
empiricists defend the use of the senses as the only source of 
acceptable “scientific” knowledge? And why that vehement insistence 
on the summary exclusion of all other sources of knowledge such as 
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religious concepts assumed to be ‘revealed’ knowledge? It would have 
been interesting to try here to trace the historical development of 
science and the scientific method to be in a position to give detailed 
answers to these two questions. That, however, goes beyond the scope 
of this paper. Fortunately, there exists a vast literature on the subject, 
to which the reader may be referred (see e.g. Sarton, 1975; Levi, 1975; 
Ravetz, 1975). 
Suffice it at this point to conclude with Polkinghorne (1984) that: 
“In Western philosophy, there has been an ongoing search for a 
foundation or ground upon which to secure true knowledge. After 
scriptural authority and Descartes’ clear and undoubtable ideas ... 
were found wanting, there was a general acceptance of sense 
experience as the base for certainty”. (p.418) “emphasis added”. It 
is widely acknowledged today that the emergence of that warped 
positivist/ empiricist tradition, with its single-minded emphasis on 
sense experiences was only the bitter harvest of the unfortunate 
conflict between the church and the nascent scientific community 
during the Renaissance. As a consequence, scientists resolutely 
determined to break loose from church authority at any price, went so 
كفتıدلجم ، ر ) ، (1ددع )1420/99 ، (1أ ـه.بجر ميهاربإ د 
far - it seems - as to throw the baby with the bath water. But this calls 
for elaboration. 
We are told by historians of science that “Western philosophy in 
the Middle Ages was primarily a Christian philosophy, clarifying the 
divine revelation ... “but” the Renaissance mounted its revolt against 
the reign of religion and therefore reacted against the church, against 
authority, against Scholasticism, and against Aristotle. “Levi, 
1975:261). Toulmin (1975) adds that” Francis Bacon, author of the 
method of exhaustive induction ... reacted against the Scholastic 
reliance on Aristotle’s authority by calling for return to firsthand 
experience... was preoccupied with empirically observed facts as 
the starting point for all science...” (emphasis added) (p.378) To 
clear away from Aristotle, whose ideas were adopted as official 
doctrine by the church, an independent source for gaining true 
knowledge had to be found and to be consecrated! Sense experience, 
the capacity for which is owned by everybody and not monopolized 
by the clergy was the most fitting answer. This was indeed a 
reasonable foundation on which to base our search for the truth. 
However, to free science - forever - from the grip of the church or 
from any other arbitrary authority for that matter, sense experiences 
were to be regarded as the “sole source” of scientific knowledge. This 
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was meant to completely and irrevocably exclude revelation - true or 
false - from playing any role whatsoever anywhere in the whole brave 
new scientific enterprise. 
This ideology served its purposes very well as it guided physical 
scientists engaged in the study of natural, material phenomena. The 
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subject matter under study, by its nature, was amenable to objective 
observation from outside through the use of the senses and through 
equipment designed to extend their reach. The validity of verification 
of the findings was guaranteed through replication of experiments, 
done on inanimate matter or non-human organisms. Certainty seemed 
to be easily within our reach, or so it appeared - up to a point. This of 
course, explains the exemplary success of the “traditional” scientific 
method in the study of natural phenomena. 
Hoping to achieve a comparable degree of success in the study of 
humans, scientists “or rather philosophers at that point in time” 
enthusiastically called for the application of the same methods used in 
the natural sciences to the realm of the social sciences. But this was 
not the only motive behind the call for emulating the physical sciences 
- as should be clear from the historical account above. Scientists were 
also keen to seal out any influence the church may still claim on the 
“scientific” study of human being in particular, because understanding 
and guiding human affairs was exactly the bone of contention between 
scientists and religious authorities. This is where August Compte’s 
call for positivism could be understood, with its insistence that “The 
methods of physical sciences are regarded as the only accurate means 
of obtaining knowledge, and therefore the social sciences should be 
limited to the use of these methods and modeled after the physical 
sciences”. (Theodorson & Theodorson, 1969:306). This should also 
explain the wide acceptance of positivist ideas among social scientists 
and beyond. Feigl (1975) points out the anti-church motive behind 
this call when he stated that “In its basic ideological posture, 
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positivism is thus worldly, secular, anti-theological, and antimetaphysical” (p.877). But 
what did all that mean for the social 
sciences and their research methods? How did nineteenth century 
views of the world and of the methods of knowing about the world 
held by the physical scientists affect the study of human being, then 
and until the dawn of the twenty-first century? 
(III) THE POSITIVIST/ EMPIRICIST IMPACT ON THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 
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in 1843 John Stuart Mill wrote that “The backward state of the 
moral “human” sciences can be remedied by applying to them the 
methods of physical science, duly extended and generalized.” 
(Polkinghorne, 1984:416). The first part of this advice was religiously 
followed by social scientists since then. The consequences of 
emulating the physical sciences were dire indeed. To appreciate the 
extent of the damage done as a result of the indiscriminate use of these 
same methods in the study of humans, let us examine the 
characteristics of the version of science and the scientific method 
which were applied in the physical sciences at that time and which 
still drag on up to this day. Authorities on the subject would tell us 
that nineteenth century science could generally be described as 
materialistic, mechanistic, and reductionist, reflecting conceptions of 
reality prevalent in that era (Sorokin, 1941; Augros and Stanciu, 
1984). 
In physics, Newton’s formulations have since the seventeenth 
century been successfully applied to explain much of the physical 
world on the basis of the existence of “matter” alone. As a result, 
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scientists came to view “materialism” as part and parcel of the 
scientific method itself (Augros & Stanciu, 1984). This was, according 
to Capra (1982), coupled with a “mechanical” view of the cosmos. 
He states that “For two and a half centuries physicists have used a 
mechanistic view of the world to develop and refine .. classical 
physics ..Matter was thought to be the basis of all existence, and the 
material world was seen as a multitude of objects assembled into a 
huge machine ...“that” consists of elementary parts... complex 
phenomena could be always understood by reducing them to their 
building blocks and by looking for the mechanisms through which 
these interacted. This attitude, known as reductionism, ... has often 
been identified with the scientific method.” (31-32). 
Unfortunately, human beings came to be understood and to be 
studied within the same mechanical, reductionist, and materialist 
mentality. Research methods and research designs reflecting these 
same ontological and epistemological assumptions were used (Ford, 
1984). All this was done without serious reflection on how the subject 
matter of the social sciences differed in very significant ways from 
that of the physical sciences. This type of confusing two very different 
phenomena and treating them alike is sometimes called a “category 
error” or a “category mistake” (Weick, 1987:222). The effects were 
debilitating indeed. We do not need to go to great lengths 
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documenting the failure of the behavioral and social sciences in their 
efforts to understand human beings and to account for their behavior. 
This is well documented and all too familiar. And many critics are 
even coming to see the connection between these failures on the one 
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hand and the outdated mode of viewing the world and conceptualizing 
science which still dominate the social sciences even today. 
Critics of psychological research and practice for example, are 
coming to say in different words something like the following. 
“psychology has an identity problem. After more than a century of 
official existence ... there is even debate of our subject matter.. Staats 
and Kosh agree that psychology’s splintered condition results, at least 
in part, and probably most importantly, from the existence of sharply 
polarized opinion about the epistemological underpinnings of 
psychology”. (Kimble, 1984:833 [Italics added]). Similar assessments 
of the situation in psychology abound. (Howard, 1985; Augros & 
Stanciu, 1984; Bergin, 1980; Polkinghorne, 1984). 
The same applies to sociology (e.g. Dixon, 1973; Gouldner, 1970). 
Walter Wallace had to complain that “The appalling fact.. is that even 
now, after decades of research and teaching, virtually none of the key 
substantive terms in sociology has acquired an explicitly standard 
meaning to any large majority of sociologists... scientifically speaking, 
we sociologists simply do not know (and may not care) what we are 
talking about” [Italics his]. (1988:23-24). He goes on to quote other 
prominent sociologists such as Wiley, Collins, Alexander, and Gans, 
who lament what they see as a “theoretical IuII” in sociology..., or a 
“rather widespread feeling that sociology in recent years has been in a 
depression ... [and] the feeling that our work is going nowhere” (: 59). 
But Wallace, the self-admitted naturalist, had to find some way to 
explain out the malaise so that naturalism could come out unscathed. 
The explanation has to come still from within the parameters of the 
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normal paradigm. He thus concludes that this disciplinary condition is 
only temporary, implying that more of the same would do the trick - 
but all it takes “for him” is to follow the theoretical mapping he 
provides! Echoes of the above could be also heard in the other social 
sciences. (Moten, 1990). In social work, a heated debate has been 
going on for a decade to the same effect. (see references to such works 
in, Peile, 1988). 
Many critics are increasingly coming to see that the major problems 
with the social sciences find their roots in the fact that human beings 
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are different in many ways from things, machines or other living 
organisms. This fact should, by necessity, require corresponding 
modifications in the theoretical models and research methods used to 
study human beings. Howard (1985) puts it this way: “...if humans 
possess characteristics that are unlike the characteristics of subject 
matter studied by other sciences, then an appropriate science of human 
behavior might need to be somewhat different from other extant 
sciences”. (p.p.259-260). Polkinghorne (1984) goes one step further, 
identifying five areas in which the “human realm” is different, and 
suggesting the appropriate research stance corresponding to each. The 
human realm is different in terms of : 
(a) its systemic character; hence, contextual relations are more 
important than those among parts. 
(b) its unclear boundaries is the rule not the exception; hence, the 
inappropriate-ness of deductive-numeric operations. 
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(c) unfinished quality; the human realm is in flux, and has a history; 
hence, correlations between elements may hold at one time but not 
at another. 
(d) composition, knowing humans is a “human” activity; hence, there 
is no absolute point outside ourselves from which to investigate. 
e) difficulty of access, the human realm is not directly observable 
from the outside, is saturated with meaning, hence, we have to 
accept evidence which is different in nature than observation. 
Another theme that runs through criticisms of a social science bent 
on following on the footsteps of the natural sciences is that of the total 
exclusion of the “spiritual” or religious dimensions of the human 
being. Bergin (1980) for example reports that “an examination of 30 
introductory psychology texts turned up no references to the possible 
reality of spiritual factors. Most did not have the words God or 
religion in their indexes”. He further quotes the psychologist Robert 
Hogan as saying “Religion is the most important social force in the 
history of man... But in psychology, anyone who...tries to talk in an 
analytic, careful way about religion is immediately branded a 
meathead; a mystic; an intuitive...sort of moron”(p.99). 
Roger Sperry, on the basis of his vast research on split-brain (for 
which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1982) talks about a 
“theoretical turnabout” in psychology. He describes the emerging 
“new view of reality” as one that “...accepts mental and spiritual 
qualities as causal realities...Instead of excluding mind and spirit, the 
new outlook puts subjective mental forces near the top of the brains’s 
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causal control hierarchy and gives them primacy in determining what 
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a person does” (1988: 608-609). But how did this turnabout come 
through? Was it the result of some literal “soul” searching on the part 
of behavioral and social scientists who should be experiencing a 
theoretical near-breakdown? Far from it! The emerging new 
paradigm, to a large extent, was a direct result, instead, of the 
revolutionary discoveries in - again - the physical sciences! Classical 
physics had first to crumble under the weight of new discoveries in the 
first three decades of this century; then to be replaced by the new 
paradigm in physics; then social science waits for fifty more years till 
the new developments sink in, before it sheepishly reconsiders its 
position in the light of the new paradigm in the physical sciences, 
again! We are only recently starting to act. 
(IV) NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENCE, AND THE NEW 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
According to Augros & Stanciu (1984) respectively a philosopher 
of science and a physicist, science has since the beginning of this 
century, undergone a series of exciting revolutions in physics, in 
neuroscience, in cosmology, and in psychology. Capra, also a 
physicist, in his 1982 monumental work documented these 
developments in detail, and followed through with a description of 
their societal ramifications and consequences. He states that the 
“dramatic changes of concepts and ideas that has occurred in physics 
...in our current theories of matter ...[have] brought about a profound 
change in our worldview; from the mechanistic...to a holistic and 
ecological view... [with] deep insights into the nature of matter and its 
relation to the human mind...” (p.p. VII-XVIII). Space would not 
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allow a fuller appreciation of his account of the fascinating 
developments which shaped modern physics as a result of Albert 
Einstein’s pioneering work on relativity, and of Niels Bohr and 
Werner Heisenberg’s work on quantum theory. Capra’s work contains 
a wealth of detail in that respect. However, because of the centrality of 
the subject to our argument, some extensive quoting here may be in 
order. Capra tells us that these developments “shattered all the 
principal concepts of the Cartesian world view and Newtonian 
mechanics. The notion of absolute space and time, the elementary 
solid particles, the fundamental material substance, the strictly causal 
nature of physical phenomena, and the objective description of nature, 
none of these concepts could be extended to the new domains into 
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which physics was now penetrating”(p.62). One of the most important 
consequences of the theory of relativity for example was “the 
realization that mass is nothing but a form of energy 
...Physicists...measure the masses of particles in the corresponding 
energy units...Atoms consist of particles, and these particles are not 
made of any material stuff. When we observe them we never see any 
substance;...[only] dynamic patterns continually changing into one 
another...”(p.p. 81-82). 
The new discoveries in atomic and subatomic physics came as a 
“great shock” to scientists. Even Einstein reportedly felt as though 
“the ground had been pulled out from under [him]”. Far from the hard, 
solid particles they were supposed to be, “atoms were found to consist 
of vast regions of space in which electrons moved around the nucleus, 
which in turn is comprised of protons and neutrons. Even those 
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subatomic particles “were nothing like the solid objects of classical 
physics...[they] are very abstract entities which have a dual aspect. 
Depending on how we look at them, they appear sometimes as 
particles, sometimes as waves... The situation seemed hopelessly 
paradoxical until it was realized that the ‘particle’ and ‘wave’ refer to 
classical concepts which are not fully adequate to describe atomic 
phenomena. An electron is neither a particle nor a wave, but it may 
show particle-like aspects in some situations and some wave-like 
aspects in others”. (Capra:67). Capra comments on these insights by 
saying that theories of contemporary science reveal a conception of 
the world which can be “in perfect harmony with [the working 
scientists’] spiritual aims and religious beliefs”. John Polkinghorne 
(1986: 1994), yet another physicist, heartily agrees. 
New developments in neuroscience and in psychology in the last 
twenty years proved to be no less revolutionary than those described 
above in physics. Sperry (1988) contrasts these with the old paradigm. 
He describes the traditional model in neuroscience and psychology as 
proclaiming “a full account of brain function and behavior to be 
possible in strictly objective physiochemical and physiological terms, 
with no reference to conscious experience... Things such as moral 
values, the human spirit, purpose, dignity, and freedom to choose, if 
they existed at all, were supposed to be only epiphenomena..[that] 
supposedly, in no way changed the course of events in the real 
world...” (p.p. 607-608). He then reports that the early nineteen 
seventies brought about, with a remarkable suddenness, a revolution 
in the scientific treatment of the relation of mind and brain. In his 
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words,” The new mentalist thinking brings basic revisions of causal 
explanation that provide scientists with a new philosophy, a new 
outlook, a new way of understanding and explaining ourselves and the 
world. The full range of the contents and qualities of inner 
experience...are not only given a new legitimacy in science but are 
also given primacy over the more physiochemical forces”. (p.608). 
He further elaborates on the causality model on which this 
“cognitive”, “mentalist”, or “humanist” revolution is based. He 
explains that “The traditional assumption in neuroscience...implicit 
in...all the natural sciences, supposes everything to be determined 
from below upward, following the course of evolution. In this 
materialist ‘microdeterministic ’ view of nature, all mental and brain 
functions are determined by, and can be explained...[in the last 
analysis] in terms of subatomic physics and quantum mechanics...[In 
contrast] the new mentalist-cognitive tenets...take into account new, 
previously nonexistent, emergent properties, including the mental, that 
interact causally at their own higher level, and also exert causal 
control from above downward...over their constituent neuronal events 
- at the same time that they are determined by them. 
Microdeterminism is integrated with emergent determinism”. (p.609). 
The new paradigm has now been reflected in “a new philosophy of 
science”, which also seems to be gaining some momentum in the 
social sciences. And the movement is manifesting itself in many 
different ways. Declarations, for example, are repeatedly made that 
the basic assumptions which informed the traditional model of science 
are “no longer considered viable”. In 1974, Suppe wrote that” the vast 
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majority of working philosophers of science seem to fall on that 
portion of the spectrum which hold the [traditional view of science] 
fundamentally inadequate and untenable” (Polkinghorne:420). A 
minority of practicing social scientists have for a long time felt the 
same way. They have been voicing dissatisfaction with the 
experimental model, operationalism, and with the perennial 
preoccupation with statistics and numbers. Pitrim Sorokin (1956) 
rightfully attacked these tendencies, calling them Quantophrenia and 
Testophrenia and had even stronger and more colorful words in his 
arsenal. 
Another significant manifestation of the dissatisfaction with 
positivism in the social sciences is the revolt against the oncepopularized “myth” of 
value-free sociology. Alvin Gouldner (1973) 
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strongly attacked the dogma that ‘thou shalt not commit a value 
judgment‘, which many sociologists have propagated for long. And he 
exposed this myth for what it really is. He puts it this way:” ...the 
doctrine of a value-free sociology is a modern extension of the 
medieval conflict between faith and reason. It grows out of, and still 
dwells in, the tendency prevalent since the thirteenth century to erect 
compartments between the two as a way of keeping the peace between 
them”. (p.20). The advocates of value-free social science may still 
argue that the doctrine is subscribed to as a guarantee of the 
objectivity of the scientist. It saves us from falling victim to our own 
biases. But how can we reconcile this with the now very influential 
position that” External reality, as existing apart from the perceiver, 
simply cannot be objectively known. Shared realities are inter- 
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subjectively valid, but their objective validity cannot be known” 
(Strong, 1984:471). So, the exclusion of values would never really 
seem to solve the problem. We would be in a better position to serve 
the cause of scientific inquiry if the specific values on which our 
theories are founded were explicitly laid out. This renders them open 
to criticism by others, instead of allowing them to operate sub rosa. 
THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES (v) 
With the narrowness of the positivist/ empiricist perspective in the 
social sciences thus effectively exposed, search was diligently on by 
many for viable alternatives, by way of reform or of revolution. The 
suggestions made however did unfortunately suffer from the selfinflicted limitations 
necessitated by the pitch of each author‘s initial 
critique. So, the most vehement critics of empiricism had to produce a 
clearly revolutionary alternative which should have nothing in 
common with the culprit in any way! Consequently, their proposals 
came out squarely off the mark. The reformists, on the other hand 
tended to espouse positions that at least appear to have a balanced 
gloss to them. They lost in creativity to the extent that their critique of 
the prevailing paradigm was timid and less original. However, we 
have to say, that most of the proponents of the new alternatives were 
still caught within the historicity of the Nineteenth Century ontology 
and epistemology. All of this does not promise to be adequately 
dealing with the situation or leading anywhere. Some alternatives 
apparently address some neglected gap or another. Some suggest 
different approaches to the same aspects. This does not seem to add up 
to much. 
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Giddens tells us that the” orthodox consensus” rooted 
in”positivistic or naturalistic philosophies of natural science.. is no 
more. The dissolution of the orthodox consensus has been 
substantially brought about by the critical attacks which have been 
mounted against positivism in philosophy and the social sciences..” . 
He goes on to say that”An interest in hermeneutics is one - among 
various other - responses to the toppling of the orthodox consensus.. I 
do want to claim that, in social theory, a turn to hermeneutics cannot 
in and of itself resolve the logical and methodological problems left 
by the disappearance of orthodox consensus” (p.p. 1-5). Nazrul Islam 
reaches something like the same conclusion with regards to another 
possible alternative, that is, phenomenology. He tells us that”Husserl‘s 
phenomenology is in no way a clear cut method or an unquestioned 
philosophy. The questions he raised regarding the positivist stance are 
definitely important and need to be answered, but a simple ‘reversal 
of the traditional way of proving the existence of the others via the 
existence of their material bodies‘ as he did is not enough” (1983: 
137-139, 145). A parallel to these same statements is echoed with 
regard to participatory research by Latapi (1988) who, although 
dismissing”..the claim that PR [Participatory Research] constitutes a 
new research paradigm for the social sciences..” comes to conclude 
that “..some useful lessons should be drawn from [it] for improving 
present social research practice” (: 310). 
In psychology and in counseling, we also encounter some clear 
parallels to the above evaluations of the situation. In a flurry of 
exchanges in the mid-eighties, in the American Psychologist and in 
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the Journal of Counseling Psychology, a number of distinguished 
scholars such as Howard, Patton, and Polkinghorne have taken 
positions which were described by some as calling for” a 
revolutionary change” (Strong, 1984: 470), Borgen (1984), however, 
appears to be only inclined to a reformist stance when he says that “ it 
is possible to study humans as active agents”, a basic dictum of the 
new paradigm, “within the traditional view of science”. Dawis (1984) 
seems to concur with that view. On the other hand, however, after 
considering those same contributions more carefully, Borgen (1984) 
concludes that even these seemingly revolutionaries may be rather 
looking for integration, and 
the perspectives of phenomenology and hermeneutics may help 
towards achieving that end. The trouble with most of these types of 
discussions is that they, as was mentioned before, are incapable of 
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rising above the historical/ intellectual baggage of the Western (or 
rather the European) science, that resulted from the church-science 
troubled relations. 
Pitrim Sorokin‘s towering figure, however, stands alone in a class 
by himself in his account of how cultural and historical factors highly 
impact, or even create, a science and scientific research in their own 
image. On the basis of his vast, meticulous historical/ quantitative 
analyses, he has demonstrated that the”value-system “ adopted by any 
particular culture at any point in its history defines all the 
fundamental“compartments” of that culture. One such compartment is 
its”systems of truth and knowledge”, Which includes science and 
scientific research (1985: 226-283). To use Kuhn‘s terminology, we 
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may say that a culture‘s value system defined the character and 
boundaries of the”paradigm” within which normal science is 
practiced. Sorokin provided us with a highly coherent description, 
diagnosis and prognosis of the”Crisis of Our Age”, which should 
indeed inform the current post-positivist debate as it applies to social 
science research. It also provides us with the long haul historical 
context for understanding the developments alluded to earlier on the 
origins of the positivist glorification of sense experience as source of 
all valid knowledge. But this calls for some more elaboration. 
Based on his elaborate historical analysis of social and cultural 
dynamics over the last 2500 years, Sorokin concluded that a culture‘s 
character is determined by its mentality, its value-system rather than 
by the social system or the personality system. He isolated three major 
types of culutre, each with its own value system. These are a) the 
Ideational, b) the Sensate, and c) the Idealistic “super-systems of 
culture”. To these three super-systems of culture there are three 
corresponding “Systems of Turth and Knowledge”.The Ideational 
periods are spiritually oriented, where “an infinite, super-sensory, and 
super-rational God...is the supereme principle of true reality and 
value”. The existence of everything is transient and ultimately 
inconsequential except His.“Ideational truth is the truth revealed by 
the grace of God, through his mouthpieces (the prophets, mystics, and 
founders of religion), disclosed in a supersensory way through mystic 
experience, direct revelation, divine intuition and inspiration. Such a 
truth may be called the truth of faith.” The Sensate periods are 
materially oriented, where”true reality and values are sensory. Only 
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what we see, hear, smell, touch, and otherwise perceive through our 
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sense organs is real and have value. Beyond such a sensory reality 
either there is nothing, or , if there is something, we cannot sense it; 
therefore it is equivalent to the non-real and the non-existent. As such 
it may be neglected”. The Idealistic periods integrate aspects of the 
other two.“ It is a synthesis of both, made by our reason. In regard to 
sensory phenomena, it recognizes the role of the sense organs as the 
source and criterion of the validity or invalidity of a proposition. In 
regard to supersensory phenomena, it claims that any knowledge of 
these is impossible through sensory experience and is obtained only 
through the direct revelation of God. Finally, our reason, through logic 
and dialectic can derive many valid propositions - for instance, in all 
syllogistic and mathematical reasoning.” (1941: 18,67-68). 
Where do we stand today in terms of the above mapping? 
According to Sorokin, we are “at the end of a brilliant six-hundredyear-long Sensate 
day”, with all its magnificent scientific and 
technological achievements. Sensate culture, sees”true reality “ to be 
sensory.“Another name for this truth of the senses is empiricism” 
(1941:13,71). ‘Sensate truth, or empiricism... rejects any revealed 
super-sensory truth. It discredits also, to a certain extent, reason and 
logic as sources of truth until their deductions are corroborated by the 
testimony of the sense organs.” (:72). But the Sensate culture has 
exhausted its creativity. We are drifting into a phase of a “dying 
sensate culture”, which is characterized by a combination of Passive 
Sensate and Cynical Sensate Mentalities.“And the night of the 
transitory period begins with its nightmares...and heart rending 
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horrors. Beyond it however, the dawn of a new great idealistic culture 
is probably waiting to greet men of the future”(:13). 
Although some of the above statements are couched in rich 
metaphor (vantage Sorokin!) it should be remembered that his 
analyses nevertheless are steeped in hard-nosed empirical evidence. 
The way out, according to Sorokin on the basis of vast historical/ 
statistical evidence, is the “correction of the fatal mistakes of the 
sensate phase ...with a shift from the agonizing sensate to the 
ideational or idealistic or integral.” (:255-6). So, according to 
Johnston (1990),“Sorokin‘s solution to this endless cycle [from one 
super-system to another] was the pursuit of Integral truth. This form of 
knowing is not identical with any of the three forms of truth, but 
embraces all of them. It combines the empirical truth of the senses; the 
rational truth of reason; and the super-rational truths of faith” (:101). 
It is my contention that Sorokin‘s”Integral theory of truth and 
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reality” do provide us with the most promising epistemological 
grounding for an effective answer to the questions posed by the 
critique of the positivist/ empiricist tradition. It not only adequately 
helps effectively free us from the straitjacket of the positivist/ 
empiricist tradition, but also allows us to transcend the historical/ 
political blinders of the church/ science conflict. The Integral Theory 
of Truth is favorably compared with the reductionist versions of the 
truth as follows:“In this three dimensional aspect of the truth of faith, 
of reason, and of the senses, the integral truth is nearer to absolute 
truth than any one-sided truth ... The empirico-sensory aspect of it is 
given by the truth of the senses; the rational aspect by the truth of 
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reason; the super-rational aspect by the truth of faith...Each of these 
systems of truth separated from the rest becomes less valid or more 
fallacious, even within the specific field of its own competence.” 
(1957:691). 
We have seen earlier how the new discoveries in neuroscience are 
supportive of the basic notion of the legitimacy of the scientific study 
of inner experiences - including the spiritual aspects - as causal 
factors in determining human behavior. Abraham Maslow in his work 
on the”Theory of Metamotivation “asserts that” The spiritual life is 
part of the human essence. It is a defining characteristic without which 
human nature is not full human nature... The “highest” values, the 
spiritual life .. are.. proper subjects for scientific study and research.. 
However, he goes to great lengths in attempting to prove - without 
proof - that the “value life (spiritual, religious, philosophical, 
axiological ..etc.) is an aspect of human biology.. It is a kind of 
‘higher‘ animality”. (1977:36-40). But that is beside the point. For 
purposes of research - its subject matter and its method - the fact that 
Maslow, after decades of diligent work, comes to identify the 
spiritual“phenomena” or the empirical manifestations from which it 
could be detected is what counts here. Even more significant in this 
respect is his denunciation of the “ ..ubiquity of stupidly limited 
theories of motivation all over the world.”, something which, 
ironically, he himself has more than anyone else contributed to. In any 
case, this clearly shows that we seem to be forced to move in the 
directions suggested by Sorokin‘s work - if we like it or not. 
But of course, nobody can bread this as a call for scientists to go 
mystical! Nothing is farther from the truth. What is implied here is 
basically and unequivocally a call for the reinstatement of the 
spiritual, non-empirical aspects of the human being as active causal 
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factors, among the other factors which causally shape human 
behavior. This relates to that aspect of reform concerned with the 
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boundaries of the”subject matter” to be studied by the social sciences. 
And because the spiritual factors are supersensory, that is by 
definition not accessible to observation through the senses, religious 
insights derived from super-rational revealed knowledge had also to 
be reinstated as a “Source” for plausible hypotheses. 
But to translate Sorokin‘s formulations into a viable research 
paradigm for the social sciences requires a clear delineation of the way 
in which the three celebrated sources of knowledge, i.e., revelation, 
reason, and senses, can be integrated into a unified paradigm for 
scientific investigation, which should uncompromisingly live up to the 
best of the scientific ethos. The traditional model of science emanating 
from “the orthodox consensus” had no real problems when the 
subject matter of study is strictly empirical/ material. The validity of 
observations could be vouched for through the truth of the senses. In 
the theory building phase, the application of reason guarantees 
coherence, but the logical consequences of whatever was arrived at 
through reason should once again be validated through sense 
experience. But that is as far as the empiricist, old paradigm goes. The 
most significant questions that should be raised now with regards to 
the new paradigm are the following: 
How do we integrate the truth of faith (intuition or revelation) into (1) 
this integral, unified “scientific method”? 
Whose faith or religious tradition? (2) 
What criteria for assessing the validity of whatever results we may (3) 
arrive at? Or is it -once again- a matter of accepting religious 
dogma and superimposing it on the facts? 
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These are indeed serious questions which have to be addressed in a 
very serious manner. Sorokin recognized the difficulties involved in 
this regard when he said that “The validity of sensory experience and, 
in a less degree, of logical reasoning is pretty well established 
nowadays. More doubtful appears intuitional truth.”(1941:87). But to 
him, of course, if the task of integration has been adequately achieved 
in the real world, once or rather many times during some of the more 
luminous, albeit short-lived, epochs of human history, it could 
definitely be done again and again. Which sounds reasonable, and 
within our reach if only we are convinced of the validity of that 
position and if we were not hampered by the shackles of our own past 
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professional socialization in “normal science”. The next section will 
be devoted to a presentation of the proposed scheme for a translation 
of Sorokin‘s vision into, hopefully, an integral approach for social 
science research. This is, by necessity a very tentative attempt (at a 
very ambitious undertaking), which should be seen as such. However, 
it is, hopefully, not a simple-minded attempt at a solution that just 
glosses over thorny issues. The situation is more serious than that. 
What is at stake here is nothing less than a decision as to whether the 
social sciences will ever be able to overcome their current malaise and 
or whether we –to be able to really contribute to human well being 
will prefer to continue with business as usual, satisfied with our 
positions, benefits and prestige .. even while Rome burns to ashes. 
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AN INTEGRAL APPROACH TO THEORY BUILDING AND (VI) 
RESEARCH 
The human being , according to the emerging paradigm, is not only 
his material being. He combines both the material, observable, 
empirical aspects with the spiritual, non-empirical aspects, in an 
integrated, indivisible unity which lasts as long as he lives. Human 
behavior is the resultant of the dynamic interplay between these two 
types of forces. The human being cannot be correctly understood 
when reduced to either one of these constituent parts, to the exclusion 
of the other; or when “interaction” between the two components is 
ignored. Let‘s, however, set the “interaction” issue aside for a 
moment to focus on the workings of the basic two elements of the 
amalgam. We do not expect to face difficulties when the focus of our 
study is on the observable, or empirical aspects of the human being, 
like studying visual and auditory perception or effects of certain drugs 
on behavior in psychology or the study of spatial distributions of 
people across regions in demography. After all, most of our research 
methods and techniques in the past have been geared to the 
investigation of such empirically observable aspects. Our “senses” do 
provide the raw material for knowledge, and “reason” is supposed to 
enmesh these findings “logically” together in a coherent fashion to 
render them “understandable” as a basis for further potentially fertile 
exploration. 
The big question is, how are we ever to study the other component, 
the spiritual, non-empirical aspects of our being. The difficulty here 
stems from the fact that soul, or the spiritual aspects are by definition 
not amenable to study by reference to sensory experience. This aspect 
of human existence is not space- or time- bound. The vehicle for 
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understanding such phenomena cannot be the sense organs. Nor could 
it be studied through reason alone, for reason can only process what 
inputs of data - sensory or otherwise - that come its way in accordance 
with its innate logical rules. Its speculation beyond that is mostly 
groping in the darkness, since it lacks an anchor either in empirical 
data or any other source of credible information. 
With all of our human faculties thus exhausted, we are left with the 
only other source of viable knowledge which can help us understand 
those elusive aspects of our own existence. It is here that we come 
face to face with the need to consult “revelation” , which is supposed - 
in the celestial religions at least - to emanate from God and to be 
transmitted through his chosen and trustworthy messengers to 
humankind. The Supreme Being who created us did withhold from us 
any direct means to gain knowledge regarding this innermost, most 
valuable component of our being, our soul. But He sent Messengers to 
provide human being with valid insights into this aspect of their being. 
The “validity” issue of any specific claims of divine revelation could 
be decided upon through scrutiny of evidence as to whether the 
alleged Messenger historically existed or not, and whether the “subject 
matter” of revelation, i.e. scripture, has managed to reach us intact or 
not. But that is a realm for exploration by solemn religious scholars. 
Social scientists are more interested in theory-building and 
verification or falsification of specific ideas or hypotheses as they go 
on the business of attempting to understand the dynamics of 
individual and social behavior of the human being. But that is not 
meant to detract in any way from the important contribution of 
religious scholars to the cause of the ongoing search for the ultimate 
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truth. Their efforts - if sincere - could indeed help tortured souls find 
their way in a troubled world through the guidance of a holistic and 
wholesome true belief. 
But in the social sciences, our interest is limited to the goals of 
understanding, explanation, and prediction. And we are coming to 
realize that most probably religious insights could be instrumental in 
helping us attain these scientific goals. We do not need, then, to worry 
about the thorny issues of historical and substantive scrutiny of 
evidence to establish the validity of any particular version of alleged 
revelation. Theory-building since Popper gives us a clue as to how can 
we utilize such insights into the scientific enterprise. But for this we 
need to dwell for a moment on the issue of the pivotal role played by 
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“theory” in science. 
There is general agreement that “the goal of science is to develop 
theory” (Turner, 1978:24). As Dawis puts it..“theory is the end 
product of scientific activity, but an end product that is never final 
because it is subject to revision and eventual rejection if a better 
theory is found (1984:468). Kerlinger (1979) also explains the”high 
esteem” held by scientists for theory. He tells us that such esteem 
“springs from the basic purpose of science, and theory is the vehicle 
for expressing the purpose. Science, then, has no other purpose than 
theory, or understanding and explanation”(p.280). Many working 
scientists see empirical observations as the solid, building blocks of 
science. However, new paradigm thinking has shown that 
observations are first made and are later interpreted and given 
meaning only within a specific frame of reference, a theory of sorts - 
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explicit or implicit. So, observations - whatever the degree of validity 
ascribed to them do not determine theory. Howard (1985) explains the 
nature of the relations between observation and theories as follows 
:”Because empirical ‘facts‘ can support a multitude of incompatible 
theoretical positions, and [because] observations in science are, in 
fact, theory dependent, the link between theory and observation must 
be tentative” (p.257). But theories are based on certain 
assumptions, which”are not for testing”, which delineate and limit 
the conditions under which the theory applies. If a situation violated 
the assumptions,”it is not legitimate to apply the theory” (Lin, 
1976:16). How then can we appraise theories? Howard asks,“What are 
the criteria whereby choices among theories are made? McMullin held 
that the appraisal of theory is in important respects closer in structure 
to value-judgment than it is to...rule-governed inference”... 
(Howard:257). For this reason, assumptions upon which a theory 
stands should always be explicitly laid out, even if they cannot be 
tested. This makes it possible for others to agree or to disagree with 
the assumptions, and to produce alternative assumptions that may 
prove more useful when hypotheses based on them are tested. 
And it is here that the value of Popper‘s idea of falsifiability is 
appreciated. Theories, for Popper, are often “bold conjectures”. 
Scientists should be encouraged to construct theories “ no matter how 
they deviate from the tradition”. But “all such conjectures should be 
subjected to the most severe and searching criticism and experimental 
scrutiny of their truth claims. The growth of knowledge thus proceeds 
through the elimination of error, i.e. through the refutation of 
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hypotheses that are logically inconsistent or entail empirically 
refuted consequences” (Feigl, 1975:880) [emphasis added]. In this 
way, according to Champion (1985), Popper destroyed the logical 
positivists‘ theory of induction. He proposed a “theory of conjectural 
objective knowledge that grows by a process of trial and error, 
controlled by imaginative criticism and empirical tests”. Champion 
adds that this is based on a realization“that there are numerous sources 
of knowledge : tradition, observation, imagination, mathematical and 
logical deduction...but none of these provides anything like a certain 
base or a criterion of truth.”(p.1415). 
Informed by these insights one can hardly disapprove of Dawis‘s 
call that “The world of science should be like a classical free 
enterprise marketplace, with theories as commodities. When there is a 
demand for theories (of one sort) it is to the consumers‘ advantage to 
allow the largest possible supply...I find no problem with including 
objectively unobservable ‘internal states‘ in our theories, so long 
as such theories can be tested” (Dawis, 1984:469) [emphasis added]. 
In the same vein, Allen Bergin (1980) advocates that we examine our 
values, admit that they are subjective, be clear and open. Then we 
state our values as hypotheses for testing and common consideration 
by others, and subject them to test, criticism, and verification (p.102). 
He goes on further to offer a few testable hypotheses as examples. 
And, as one scholar taught”the ultimate test of an epistemology is in 
the crucible of empirical trials” (Borgen, 1984:458). I would hasten 
only to add to these statements that we most of the time cannot 
directly test the validity of values themselves, hence, we may say that 
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we can test their logical consequences in the traditional ways 
described by those advocating an “axiomatic theory” model for the 
social sciences. 
This is exactly where“revelation” fits into the general picture of 
theory building in the social sciences. If theories are arrived at through 
the creative use of imagination or conjecture when scientists try to 
make sense of accumulated verified observation, then what do we 
loose if we substitute imagination with insights gained from intuition 
or for that matter revelation, allegedly having its source in divine 
wisdom? Homans tells us that “a leap of imagination” is required to 
bring observations together in a meaningful way (1980:19). Dubin 
(1978) also asserts that “a theoretical model is limited in no way 
except by the imagination of the theorist in what he may use as 
EDITORIAL  
 
 
Journal of tafakkur vol 1(1)1999 
 
 
Journal of tafakkur vol 1(1)1999 
 
 
elements in building the model...”, then it is for the research test in the 
real world to decide on its validity. (p.12). This should help solve one 
of the thorniest problems that tended to hamper the utilization of 
religious insights in the body of social science theorizing and research 
activities in the past. 
The problem we may have here is that whenever religion is invoked 
even among otherwise very thoughtful people, dark clouds start 
gathering in the horizon. Most social scientists seem to be conditioned 
by those historical conflicts between church and science. The 
intellectual legacy that we inherited from this conflict which was 
alluded to above resulted in an avoidance syndrome. We can afford to 
refrain from discussing religion in a social gathering, but when it 
مولعلا ةفسلفو ةفسلفلاTowards a New Paradigm for Social Science Research 
comes to matters of serious scientific consequences, this does not 
seem to be an acceptable response. 
What we can profitably do is to get the types of inappropriate 
questions and reactions out of the way by consciously and honestly 
dealing with them. This should clear the way for more thoughtful 
deliberation. One such question that has to be laid to rest may be : 
which particular religious tradition are we talking about. The 
implication of the question is that utilizing concepts that belong to any 
religion automatically means endorsing it or proselytizing in its favor. 
Or even worse zealously defending it in all sorts of reasonable or 
unreasonable ways. But nothing of the above is intended or implied 
here. Defense of a religion and its validity - as was mentioned earlier - 
is the business of its faithful religious scholars. All that the social 
scientists need from alleged-revelation is the insights and ideas they 
provide as grist for their mill of theory construction and productive 
research. For them it is not a matter of belief or disbelief. It is a matter 
of utilizing a vast and rich repository of ideas with a good potential for 
pointing to where the truth may possibly be found. And those ideas‘ 
validity has to be attested to by the rigorous test of their 
correspondence with reality - that is”total reality” as will be explained. 
This is a sine qua non for scientific inquiry. 
No exemptions from these rules could be made for the insights 
generated from our understanding of any particular revealed tradition. 
Scripture is something, our human understanding based on selective 
use of parts of scripture to generate theoretical frameworks is another 
thing. The strategy suggested here is hoped to open the doors of 
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utilization of religious insights towards a fuller and more meaningful 
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understanding of human beings and their behavior. This, in line with 
the conclusions reached by thoughtful social scientists, promises to get 
the social sciences out of the dead ends that plagued them for most of 
their history. 
Again, my reference here is mainly to “Sorokin: The World‘s Greatest 
Sociologist” as suggested by the title of the book by Carl Zimmerman 
(1968), ...a scholar whose work was favorably compared by Leopold 
von Weise with other towering intellectuals as follows :”The efforts of 
Compte, Spencer, Pareto, and Spengler seem somewhat whimsical, in 
comparison with Sorokin” (Michel Richard, in his introduction to, 
Sorokin, 1957). Our attempt to outline a strategy which enables social 
scientists to put to good use the richness of revealed knowledge 
without sacrificing anything in terms of the rigor with which all 
scientific knowledge should be based, is thought of as a humble 
contribution towards the fulfillment of the promise of his insightful 
work. 
The basic strategy suggested here for the incorporation of religious 
insights into the normal scheme of theory development - without any 
loss in external validity - consists of the following: 
Scripture, along with its interpretations and commentaries by (1) 
religious scholars would be gleaned for insights regarding human 
nature, the ultimate meaning of humans existence within the 
whole universe, nature of social relationships and societal 
arrangements. Such insights would be used in conjunction with 
available social science theories to provide as integrated a 
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theoretical framework for the understanding of the particular area 
under study as possible. 
Hypotheses would be logically derived from these integrated (2) 
theoretical frameworks for testing in the “total reality,” which 
includes both the empirical world and the non-empirical (as shall 
be elaborated on later). 
If the hypotheses thus generated are confirmed (or if we failed to (3) 
reject them) this means that: 
We have arrived at validated observations, which would be (a) 
added to the repository of the known facts, and at the same 
time, 
Our confidence in the robustness of theoretical framework (b) 
increases. 
If our hypotheses were not confirmed, that means either: (4) 
That our intuition, our understanding or interpretation of (a) 
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revelation was, in fact, incorrect to start with, or: 
That our research methods and our research procedures are (b) 
wanting. All details of research design and data collection 
have to be vetted for any flaws or discrepancies from valid 
procedure. 
As a general rule, we do not expect contradictions between any (5) 
valid intuition or correct interpretation of “true” revelation on the 
one hand, and corroborated facts on the other. That would be 
contradiction in terms, because if true revelation was “true”, this 
means that it corresponds to what is known for fact. 
The proposed strategy rests on the following assumption: 
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To the extent that an intuition or religious idea rests upon “true” (1) 
revelation we can expect that we would fail to reject hypotheses 
derived from them through meticulous testing in the real world. 
Even if theoretical formulations rest on true, valid “scripture”, (2) 
they may still fail the test of research in “total reality” if 
revelation is incorrectly interpreted by men. 
If the religious personages assumed to have received revelation (3) 
(Messengers of God) were known to have historically existed, 
with their special qualities assured, and their utterances “as 
Messengers” recorded without distortion, this would render 
plausible the theoretical frameworks generated from their 
teachings-pending verification, that is. 
Numbers 1,2, and 3 above would only pause a “fair” challenge to (4) 
institutional religion. It should help religion discard any accretions 
to religious concepts resulting from human distortions 
accumulated across centuries of any religion’s particular 
development. 
At the same time, the admission of insights derived from religious (5) 
sources to be part of theoretical frameworks would effectively rid 
the social sciences out of the unfounded arrogance of scientism. 
Such frameworks could be expected to have, at least, a modicum 
of truth. In any case, they should be superior to the use of mere 
imagination or conjecture. 
Testing hypotheses derived from these theoretical frameworks (6) 
dictates devising appropriate methods and techniques which are 
capable of tapping “total reality”. 
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But this last point deserves special attention. As was mentioned 
above, our research methods and data collection technique are well 
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developed in terms of tapping one aspect of the world around us, that 
is the empirical. When it comes to the study of “total reality” , that 
means that we have to devise methods and techniques geared to the 
study of non-empirical reality just as well. This may sound incredible 
to some. However the situation may be less hopeless than it may look 
at first. The solution of the difficulty may lie in the idea of studying 
the “interaction” of the non-empirical with the empirical. This may 
mean honing some of our current methods and techniques to make 
them sensitive enough to detecting these types of “inner signals”, as 
Maslow (1977) later came to characterize his “spiritual” aspects of 
the human experience “although to him these aspects still are nontranscendent”. 
It may entail also some redirecting of our present techniques to gear 
them to the new focus. Or it may mean devising totally new methods 
and techniques capable of penetrating into the newly targeted 
phenomena. Siporin (1985) tells us about “the desire to gain better 
ways of understanding the subjectivity and consciousness of the 
person, as well as how better to relate to the person in his or her full 
humanity, including the moral and religious dimensions...”(p.212). 
Ford (1984) calls for “different research designs, different 
measurement approaches, and different mathematical models for 
analyzing of data... to fit the nature of the phenomena being studied” 
(p.p. 465-466). Hermeneutics could provide part of the answer, but 
not all as was alluded to above. Siporin tells us for example that “The 
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hermeneutic approach seeks to apprehend, interpret, and explain the 
objective truth of knowledge, reality, people, and action in terms of 
subjective and inter-subjective human meanings and felt 
experience...[This] understanding...takes place in transactional 
processes of mutual self-reflexivity and empathic acceptance...and 
open dialogical relations between people”. (Siporin, 1985:212). 
The volume edited by Peter Reason and John Rowan titled “Human 
Inquiry: A Source-book (1981) provides a wealth of information on a 
collection of such promising methods. Work on such methods was 
further developed and reported in Reason’s more recent book on 
Participation in Human Inquiry, 1994. Recently, Judi Marshall and 
Peter Reason (1996) expressed their position as to these New 
Paradigm Research methods in terms of alignment with an emerging 
worldview “which sees us living within an interactive and 
participatory cosmos... Thus subjective and objective are engaged In a 
continuing dance of creative, participatory.. knowing. A number of 
inquiry methods such as cooperative inquiry, action inquiry, 
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participatory action research.. has been developed which are 
congruent with the emerging worlview.” 
VII- CONCLUSION 
Some of the fascinating developments which have been taking 
place in the natural sciences since the early decades of this century 
have been described above. It was pointed out that these developments 
have ushered in a revolution in the way we may see ourselves and the 
world around us. This in turn, as we saw, led to talk about a new 
philosophy of science. The inadequacies of the traditional positivist/ 
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empiricist paradigm inherited from the application of natural science 
methods to the study of human beings were pointed out. The 
damaging consequences of the adoption of that paradigm for the 
social sciences, and in fact for our contemporary societies were 
discussed. It has been shown that the “new philosophy of science” 
allows for the broadening of scope of legitimate subject matter for 
scientific study to include non-empirical as well as empirical 
phenomena. This inclusiveness has far reaching implications for social 
science research, which is still clinging to the outdated empiricist 
traditions. 
It is argued that a real scientific revolution is badly needed within 
which the non-directly-observable would be given equal treatment as 
the observable. The role of spiritual factors in determining the 
behaviors of the humans we study “as well as that of ourselves” is 
stressed. The potential of “revelation” incorporated in scripture as a 
source for plausible knowledge about these spiritual aspects is 
accentuated. The important issue of how to combine insights derived 
from transcendental sources with those gained through empirical 
observation and the application of reason is dealt with specifically 
within a theory/ research scheme. The beginnings of what may be a 
reasonable strategy to do that is humbly suggested. The general 
outlook adopted here is - intentionally - one that avoids unnecessarily 
dispensing with any methods, techniques, or orientations of proven 
value, while at the same time staunchly guarding against unwanted 
dogmatism and unwarranted authority. It is hoped that this strategy 
would adequately answer the requirements for the general integral 
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framework lucidly but accurately laid out by Pitrim Sorokin half a 
century ago. 
Kuhn’s predictions are dire indeed. It is hoped that social scientists 
would not make true his expectation that “..people doing ‘normal 
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science’ within an established set of procedures do not take kindly to 
having their contextual assumptions challenged, and new paradigm 
thinking must wait for the established opponents to die “(in Haworth, 
1984). As a matter of fact, the proponent of the new paradigm shift -to 
me- Pitrim Sorokin is no longer with us, but his ideas are still fresh as 
if they were written today. I hope we would rather rally to Sir Karl 
Popper’s motto that science should be “Revolution in permanence!” 
rather than to what some writers read Kuhn to be saying instead as: 
“not nostrums but normalcy!” (as paraphrased by Watkins, 1970 : 
28). And I would like to end by saying, with Haworth that “The 
scientific spirit.., as opposed to any particular scientific method, 
means the constant modification of conceptual conclusions by 
experience. When experience challenges the very methods being used 
to assess experience, it would seem to be ‘scientific’ to reconsider the 
methods (method includes paradigmatic assumptions as well as 
techniques)”. 
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